Abstract-There are some selfish nodes in wireless mesh networks multi-path inter-session network coding; and all selfish nodes maximize their earnings through the game. In this paper, a stimulus scheme is proposed which is suit for selfish nodes game in a multi-path inter-session network coding game. In the multi-path transmission, we use the watch dog checks the existence of selfish nodes. After selfish nodes are detected, we modified the multi-path protocols TORA. For multi-path selfish nodes, we adopt non-cooperation method to punish it; and that the priority forwarding is used to active cooperation nodes. It is proved that Nash equilibrium is acquired for all players to obey the incentive scheme honestly. Experiments verify the theoretical analysis.
I. INTRODUCTION
The performance of wireless mesh networks is improved by multi-path network coding. But there are some rogue nodes that merely enjoy the network resources without contributing the needed functionality to the network in wireless mesh networks (WMNs) [1] . Instead, it strategically selects rate to maximize its surplus, given the knowledge that the price is not constant. Clearly, the decision made by user n also depends on the rates selected by other users, leading to a resource allocation game among all users. Paper [2] has presented a game theoretic model to investigate the conditions for cooperation in wireless ad hoc networks, in the absence of incentive mechanisms. They have proven that these nodes need an incentive to cooperate. Furthermore, S. Marti [3] etc proof that the throughput of network will degrade 16%~32% when there are 10%~40% selfish nodes. When network coding is used to improve the wireless networks throughput, it must impact selfish nodes forwarding the original packet.
In order to improve overall system efficiency, we should design a scheme which can encourage more nodes to participate in encoding game. However, the current incentive methods are not suit for wireless mesh networks. For example, using the method of payment related to the authority of their needs and safety of third-party authentication, which does not meet the WMNs network environment. In WMNs, nodes cooperate with each other to maintain the entire network. The scheme based on virtual currency need to exchange large amounts of information, and once the network topology changes, it also need to re-compute the optimal compensation scheme, so that its application is not well in mobile ad hoc networks. We design an incentive strategy based on TORA protocol to motivate selfish nodes participate in encoding operations. TORA is basically an algorithm under reactive protocols for routing data across wireless mesh networks [4] . It is an on-demand routing protocol based on a directed acyclic graph (DAG). It includes three basic functions: creating routes, maintaining routes, and erasing routes. TORA maintains state on a per-destination basis and runs a logically separate instance of the algorithm for each destination. In TORA, it assigns directional heights to links so as to direct the flow of traffic from a higher source node to a lower destination.
Up to now, there are some papers which used game theoretic methods for investigating network coding problems in the network as selfish decision makers [5] - [9] .Nevertheless, they did not study the incentive scheme in multi-path inter-session network coding. T.T. Chen [10] etc propose INPAC, the first incentive scheme for packet forwarding in wireless mesh networks using network coding. It is complementary to the existing work on incentive compatible routing in the same type of wireless networks. S.G. Chen [11] etc design an incentive compatible protocol to stimulate forwarding packets and prove that only following the protocol honestly can obtain maximum utility. An incentive scheme is proposed which is used in multi-path inter-session network coding game in this paper. We analyze the watch dog detect selfish nodes in multi-path network coding, then punish the rogue nodes and encourage the active nodes in this paper. The key contributions of this paper can be summarized as follows:
As far as know we are the first to propose an incentive scheme in multi-path inter-session network coding using game. Secondly, we design an improved TORA protocol which suit for the multi-path inter-session network coding game as long as the nodes can agree on using a certain intersession network coding. In generally, reaching such equilibrium is important. Thirdly, we prove that the status is a Nash equilibrium only following the Manuscript received January 1, 2011; revised June 5, 2011; accepted July 6, 2011.
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improved TORA protocol honestly.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II describes the system model, with details on the game and Nash equilibrium. We design an incentive scheme to encourage node in network coding in section III. In section IV the Nash equilibrium of the incentive scheme is discussed and we evaluate the proposed scheme. Finally, section V summarizes the conclusions.
II. GAME THEORY AND SYSTEM MODEL It is easy that multiple unicasts establish competition between independent information flows for shared network resources because the wireless Mesh network selfish nodes as unwilling to cooperate. We make a game model of wireless mesh networks in this section firstly. Then related knowledge of the game is introduced.
Consider the scenario depicted in Figure 1 . We have two sources of traffic, each of which is aware of two paths leading to its destination node. For example, Source 1 (positioned at s1) can send packets to destination node at rates 1 1 r on path (s1, A, D, T1) and 2 1 r on path (s1, B, E, T1). In the same way, Source 2 (positioned at s2) can send packets to destination node at rates 1 2 r on path (s2, C, F, and T2) and 2 2 r on path (s2, B, E, T2). The bottleneck link (B, E) is shared by both users s1 and s2.Under the current channel conditions, the path (B, E) is a link using network coding. The two direct side links (s1, T1) and (s2, T2) allow the users to perform inter-session network coding as we explain next.
We suppose that it is cheaper for Source 1 to send all its traffic on path (s1, A, D, T1). However, notice that there is an opportunity for utilizing network coding on a path (B, E). So s1 and s2 will send their data packets to node B; Then node B sends coded packets to node E. The encode node can mark their packets for either forwarding or network coding. At node B, all packets that are marked for routing are simply forwarded to node E through link (B, E). However, the packets that are marked for network coding are treated differently. There is competition in multi-path node because the selfish pursuit of their own nodes to maximize the benefits, resulting in transmission rates continue to game. This section we introduce some knowledge.
Definition 1 ： We define a Multi-path inter-session network coding game, which is a tuple ( )
, where:
is the set of selfish nodes in multi-path; Strategies T is transmission different rates for sharing link and dedicated link. Utility includes Assumption 1: The utility function is concave, non-negative, increasing, and differentiable [12] . This paper has considered a simple model for network resource allocation: users choose the rate at which they want to send data, and links set prices according to the marginal cost of the total rate allocated. Nash equilibrium, also called strategic equilibrium, is a list of strategies, one for each player, which has the property that no player can unilaterally change his strategy and get a better payoff. The most well known form of equilibrium is the Nash equilibrium.
Definition 2 (Nash Equilibrium) A non-negative rate vector ( )
In Nash equilibrium * r , no user N n ∈ can increase its payoff by unilaterally changing its strategy n r , and
denotes the vector of selected data rates for all users other than user n .
Nash equilibrium represents a scenario for which no player has an incentive to unilaterally deviate. In a distributed engineering system, Nash equilibrium represents a stable operating point [13] . Using the utility function for network optimization, we will also consider the delay and throughput. The throughput and delay are related with flow rate. The utility function is the most important factor of flow rate in end system. So the utility function include data rate. 
,which i R is the rate of collection of all possible systems i .
III. AN INCENTIVE SCHEME IN MULTIPATH INTER-SESSION NETWORK CODING
We use the multi-path inter-session network coding transmission to improve network throughput and reliability. Our objective is to design a distributed multi-path inter-session network coding system for multiple unicast flows traversing wireless links. Although inter-session network coding has been investigated in paper [14] , it less considered the multi-path transmission. In this section, we firstly analyze the assignment strategy of the multi-path transmission, and then introduce a stimulus scheme. We have proved two theorems in paper [15] , and the detail is omitted.
Theorem 1: There has at least a Nash equilibrium in multi-path inter-session network coding game.
After Nash equilibrium of multi-path inter-session network coding game is proved, it is easy to see that an optimality case which all packets from node S1 and S2 are completely encoded. 
A. The Incentive Scheme
We show the process of the incentive scheme in the Fig.  2 . And IMEP is a protocol which provides reliable routing information and a neighbor broadcasting routing protocols change.
The main steps of the scheme are described in Fig. 3 . The main parts in the incentive scheme are watch dog and punish scheme.
Watchdog mechanism is a monitoring method used for wireless networks, and it is the base of many misbehavior detection algorithms and trust or reputation systems. The basic idea of watchdog is that watchdog node monitors whether its neighbor forwards the packets by overhearing.
Each node in the WMN cannot be isolated environment, and it must choose rationally game strategies and cooperation with other nodes. Therefore, we can reduce the vested interests of non-cooperative nodes, and punish the nodes which adopt uncooperative strategy, as a result to encourage node cooperation strategy. Usually, we think that an incentive mechanism is enforceable which should encourage nodes in the multipath routing to forward received data packets. There are three rules in order to implement the stimulators. Firstly, each player which forward the data packets actively must be paid to compensate the cost of forwarding packets. Secondly, it is important which incentive mechanism further prevent behavior of dropping or dropping part of forwarding packets in players. Thirdly, the incentive mechanism must preserve the player's claimed cost lies with in a reasonable range, with only slightly higher than the real cost which being allowed.
According to the three rules, we design the incentive scheme including four main steps. The Fig.3 describes the four steps which the implement of incentive scheme.
Incentive Scenario 1 Source node send data packets along the multi-path; 2 Data packets were encoded on the shared link; 3 Watchdog detect selfish nodes in the network; 4 Punish selfish nodes and encourage cooperate nodes. Fig. 3 The implement of incentive scheme Watch dog and punish mechanism are the main part in the incentive algorithm. The specific implementation of them the following:
B. Watch Dog Detect Selfish Nodes
This paper, we use watch dog technology in order to find selfish nodes. The main idea of watchdog was overhearing.
We implement the watchdog by maintaining a buffer of recently sent packets and comparing each overheard packet with the packet in the buffer to see if there is a match. If so, the packet in the buffer is removed and forgotten by the watchdog, since it has been forwarded to next node. If a packet has remained in the buffer for longer than a certain timeout, the watchdog increments a failure tally for the node responsible for forwarding on the packet. If the tally exceeds a certain threshold bandwidth, it determines that the node is misbehaving and sends a message to the source notifying it of the misbehaving node.
When the watch dog detect selfish nodes in the multi-path, we set two parameters which Th a and Th s represent the threshold of the node nature. When ε more than Th a , the node is is selfish. When ε more than Th s , the node is is extremely selfish. The two thresholds selection is closely related with network topology and business models, and we will discuss it in the other paper. Fig.4 describe the implement of watch dog.
Watch dog detect selfish nodes 1 When a node sends a packet to its neighbor, it also cached it locally. 2 Then the node listens to its neighbor's communication. If the neighbor does not forward the same packet to its next-hop node within a short period, it is regarded as misbehaving. 3 By this way, a node can record the successful and failed forwarding history of its next-hop. 4 We judge a node to be misbehaving when failure tally exceeds a certain threshold (Th a or Th s ) and it sends a packet backward to notify the source. Fig. 4 The process of watch dog detect selfish nodes
C. The Implement of Incentive Scheme in Multi-path Transmission
Taking into account the WMN nodes depend on each other for resulting from the collaboration, we adopt a cycle of non-cooperation as a punishment. If a selfish node adopts non-cooperation policy, then the request node will take a non-cooperation policy to the selfish node after one cycle. Even if the selfish node will be cooperate with the request node during the punish cycle, the request node will take the same policy to punish the selfish node. The incentive scheme in multi-path network coding game is related with utility function. The utility function consists of throughput, and the cost including delay time. We design a utility function that the delay is variety when using multi-path transmission the same throughput.
The system is benefit of throughput and the payment is delay time, so that we define
, in this paper, T is the throughput of node; D is the delay time of network and f is a function belong to transmit total data packets; c is a function with D .
If the selfish node refuses to cooperate, then the packet from the selfish node will be delay to forward using a punishment cycle S . As result, the utility function U will be decreased. When the node encodes actively the packet, its packets will be forward priority. So that the utility function U will be improved and the payoff is increased. There are two punishment thresholds. As to the punishment cycle S , N U and c U is the utility function of the node is no cooperative and cooperate respectively. We can get theorem 3 by modified reference [16] . Proof: if the network nodes request may be denied next, it can be seen as a loss of future benefit. We assume the probability of the interaction between nodes is
So that the income of the current node should be multiplied by the probability δ in the next cycle of periodic. It is easy to see that the return series can be described as formula (1) when node is always cooperative.
If a network node is interact with other nodes, it is not incorporation with other nodes by no cooperation strategy N .Although the selfish node obtain benefit N b using a non-cooperative strategy in this game, it will receive the punishment phase T . Assume that in the subsequent game process, the selfish node back to a cooperative strategy C, then the node gains a speculative return series available:
[ ] We use the cycle S to refuse to forward packets from the routing node as a punishment when ε is more than Th a . If ε is more than Th s ,the node is extremely selfish, so that the data from the selfish node is refused to forward by more long cycles.
The detail of punish scheme is illustrated in fig.5 .
The punish scheme 1 Detect selfish nodes using watch dog; 2 Define the utility function of cooperate node and non-cooperation node respectively; 3 If it is a selfish node, as a punishment for selfish nodes, IMEP protocol also need to filter out from the selfish node data (including data packets and control messages) 4 The nodes which are active cooperation are set forwarding priority in the IMEP protocol. 
D. Network coding implement
We use random linear network coding to encode and decode in the multi-path inter-session network coding.
(1) Network coding construction Encoder module is operated using random linear network coding. It receives packets from the receive nodes and encodes these packets. This operation is illustrated in formula (5) .The coded data packets are mixed data packets using a single linear mixture. In particular, we assume that ij a is the encoded coefficient. The new data packets will be listened and encoded by the forwarding nodes. In addition to as the encoded payload an additional header is added to the output packet that contains information about the packets and fragments used for encoding. 
(2) Decode packet in the destination
To deliver data packets with the original form, both the native and coded packets will to be buffered. Each arriving packet is inspected by the decoder to determine whether this packet is required for the decoding process or not. If not, it is not encoded; it is forwarded to the upper layer.
Otherwise, the packet is stored in the fragment buffer. Uuencoded packets that have been used for encoding are not only stored in the buffer but are also immediately forwarded to the upper layer.
The decoder model will check for decoding possibilities when a new fragment is added to the buffer. If there are enough fragments to decode an encoded packet in destination node, and the actual decoding operation is triggered and the fragments which will not be required anymore for further decoding are removed from the buffer. For instance, we can decode the k original data packets by formula (6) are received in destination node and the full rank matrix solvable is produced. Furthermore, if the result of a decoding operation just delivers a fragment of a plain packet, this fragment is also stored in the fragment buffer until the whole decoded packet can be delivered. 
IV. EVALUATION AND ANALYSIS
An incentive scheme is investigated in this paper. According to the definition of the Nash equilibrium in section II, we can prove that proposed scheme is Nash equilibrium in this section.
Theorem 4: In our scheme, payments are provided to incent every player to forward packets. It is Nash equilibrium for all players to obey incentive scheme honestly. Proof: First of all, being punished because of selfish nodes, so the delay time is increased, in other words
.So the utility function and delay is inversely proportional, so reducing the effectiveness of selfish nodes. The utility meet to the requirements of definition 3.We gain . According to definition 3, it is Nash equilibrium for all players to obey incentive scheme honestly. Furthermore the proposed algorithm has been evaluated using the network simulator 2. The experiment topology is wireless butterfly network. There are 10 nodes, and the distance of two nodes is 250 meters. The routing is an improved TORA. The simulation time is 100 seconds, and we use IEEE 802.11.The length of packet is 50 packets, and send rate is 5Mbps, and the packet size is 1024 bytes. The data flow is CBR. Fig.6 illustrates the comparison of WMNs throughput performance using CBR data flows. It is easy to see that the throughput is more using Th_IN based on incentive scheme than Th in system. It is not hard to see that the De_IN using incentive scheme is longer than the De in selfish nodes in figure 7 and it is shown that the punish scheme is effective. In this paper, we investigated the incentive scheme of selfish nodes in the multi-path inter-session network coding to improve the performance of network. The Nash equilibrium is proved in this game.
To the best of our knowledge, this works on cooperation in wireless mesh networks is little that takes the multi-path inter-session network coding game into account. In terms of future work, we intend to investigate cooperation in mobile wireless mesh networks. Mobility increases mutual dependencies between the nodes; so it gives a natural incentive for cooperation.
